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I 
One important answer to the question of how we are 
to identify material objects as identical through time 
is that material objects must preserve spatio-temporal 
(s-t, hereafter) continuity. We do not think that ma-
terial objects are the sorts of things that can move 
from one place to another without passing through all 
the intervening spatial positions, or that they can ex-
ist at one time, disappear, and then reappear at the 
same spot or position. It is the purpose of this paper 
to investigate this common conception. 
In order to see how closely s-t continuity is re-
lated to the numerical identity of material objects 
through time I shall try to defend the contrary view, 
the view that s-t discontinuous material objects can be 
numerically identical. It is not hard to think up 
cases where s-t discontinuous material objects are 
treated as numerically identical. In the realm of 
myths, fables, and science fiction examples of spatial 
discontinuity among material objects are almost 
commonplace. In a television series, the crew of the 
starship Enterprise can travel great distances in a few 
seconds without traversing any of the intervening spa-
tial positions. C. B. Martin suggests a case in which 
Merlin, a magician or genie, presents me with a pearl 
that disappears and reappears at regular or irregular 
intervals. 1 This is a case of temporal discontinuity, 
i.e., there are at least two points in time at which 
the body exists such that there is a third point in 
time between those two points at which the body does 
not exist, or ceases to exist. 
A famous case of s-t discontinuity that is not 
fiction or hypothesized is that of London Bridge. 
Recently London Bridge, which once spanned the River 
Thames, was purchased by an American millionaire and 
was dismantled and shipped to Arizona. There it was 
reassembled and has come to grace the Arizona desert as 
a tourist attraction. Another example from the ordin-
ary range of cases is where I tear up a sheet of paper, 
throw it out the window, and it is scattered in diff-
erent directions. I later realize that it is my lec-
ture notes, so I go out and luckily find all the 
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pieces, and tape the sheet of paper together. I have 
the same sheet of paper in the face of obvious s-t 
discontinuity. Again, I take my automobile apart and 
send its parts to different places for repairs. When 
the parts are in good condition I reassemble the au-
tomobile again and it is the same car. Such examples 
are relatively easy to cite. 
To highlight the strength of examples of s-t 
discontinuity consider Hobbes' famous example of the 
ship of Theseus. A wooden ship is gradually replaced 
board by board until it is all aluminum. Then someone 
constructs a ship out of the old boards exactly similar 
to the original ship. There doesn't seem to be any 
definite answer to the question "Which ship is identi-
cal with the original ship?" If one has a penchant for 
antiques, the rebuilt wooden can be said to be the ship 
that the captain and crew should cherish. If one is 
interested in longer lasting, quicker aluminum ships, 
then the captain and crew can take pride in the long 
years of service that both the aluminum and the origi-
nal ship have given them. 
II 
If the above descriptions of s-t discontinuous 
material objects that remain numerically identical at 
different times are coherent, it should be possible to 
state a sufficient condition for the numerical identity 
of material objects without any reference to s-t 
continuity. What might such a condition be? One of 
the things that convinces us in the above cases is the 
qualitative similarity of the putatively identical 
objects. The principle of the identity of indiscerni-
bles is a principle based on qualitative similarity or 
property preservation. It asserts that objects having 
all of their properties in common are numerically 
identical. Perhaps we should examine this principle as 
a viable alternative to s-t continuity. Where we are 
speaking of identity through time, there is an obvious 
objection to the identity of indiscernibles principle. 
Material objects, as a matter of fact, are the sorts of 
things that undergo qualitative changes with the pas-
sage of time. Seldom, if ever, do we find a material 
object that has exactly the same qualitative properties 
at two different times when the time gap is sufficient-
ly great. 
There is a putatively reasonable solution to the 
foregoing difficulty. In order to save the identity of 
indiscernibles principle we need to build a time ref-
erence into the specification of all properties. 
Instead of saying that my car has the property of being 
slow, we say that it has the property of being slow at 
time t. Properties which include such time references 
can be called 'time relative' properties. The identity 
of indiscernibles is now interpreted as asserting that 
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material objects having all of their time relative 
properties in common are numerically identical. This 
version of the principle has the advantage of making 
reference to the time at which an object has the rel-
evant identity properties, thus removing any difficulty 
that may arise from the fact that material things 
change properties over time. 
This interpretation of the principle makes it true 
because all material objects will have uniquely indi-
viduating properties specifiable in terms of the kind 
of material object it is and by some specific time and 
place. Since two material objects of the same kind 
cannot occupy the same place at the same time, it will 
be true that if a material object picked out at one 
time and a material object picked out at another time 
have their time and place in common, and are of the 
same kind, they will be numerically identical, 
regardless of s-t continuity. 
However, this version of the identity of indiscer-
nibles is platitudinous, and does not help us to settle 
the question of whether or not s-t continuity is a 
necessary condition for the identity of material 
objects. It tells us that if mateiral objects identi-
fied as existing at different times have all of their 
time relative properties in common, they are numeri-
cally identical; but it does not tell us what condi-
tions must be satisfied for material objects identified 
at different times to have all of their time relative 
properties in common. We are still left with the 
question we began with, for we need an independent way 
of telling whether material objects picked out at dif-
ferent times can have all their time relative proper-
ties in common. Someone who requires s-t continuity 
for physical thing identity can accept this version of 
the principle, as well as the opponent of the view. 
For if Jesus and Socrates had all of their time rela-
tive properties in common, they would be identical. 
But it is a separate question whether they do have all 
of their time relative properties in common, the answer 
to which is negative. So, from the that fact that s-t 
disconinuous objects would be identical if they had all 
of their time relative properties in common, it does 
not follow that such objects can have all of their time 
relative properties in common. 
The following unsound argument will bring out the 
irrelevance of this version of the identity of in-
discernibles for the present controversy. Suppose that 
at some time t, we find a wallet, call it Wl, occupying 
spatial position Pi. Wl has the time relative proper-
ties of being a wallet and occupying p, at time t,. 
Now we lose track of Wl. But at time t 5 we come across a wallet, call it W2, that looks very much like Wl. It 
is certainly possible to attribute the time relative 
property which is true of Wl, that of being a wallet 
and occupying position P| at time tj, to W2. Now since 
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it is possible to attribute this same time relative 
property to both Wl and W2, even when we don't know 
whether they are s-t continuous, it follows that it 
makes sense to say that Wl and W2 are numerically iden-
tical, whether or not they are s-t continuous. So 
discontinuous objects can be numerically identical. 
The unsoundness of the foregoing argument is due to 
the fact that the version of the identity of indiscer-
nibles cannot be applied in the way it roust be in order 
to yield the above conclusion. It makes sense to say 
that W2 is in p t at t t only if it makes sense to say, on independent grounds, that Wl and W2 are one and the 
same wallet. We do not decide that they are identical 
by applying a uniquely identifying description to them 
as being the object in Pi at t,, since whether W2 has 
the same time relative properties as Wl depends on 
whether they are identical. 
One way to avoid these difficulties is to restrict 
the scope of the identity of l indiscernibles, not to time relative properties, but rather to properties with 
no temporal reference at all. Such properties, e.g., 
being red, are still properties that material objects 
can gain or lose. Further restrictions are also 
necessary. We do not demand that the spatial position 
occupied by a material object at t, be the same as that 
occupied by a material object at t 1 0 , for it to be the same object. So we will say that the principle does 
not apply to spatial properties through time. We will 
also want to exclude such properties as the relation of 
being the only brother of Edward, and proper names or 
demonstratives such as 'Charles.' Thus we shall res-
trict the identity of indiscernibles to purely general, 
non-relational properties. Purely general properties 
are properties whose specification does not require the 
use of proper names or demonstratives. 
The identity of indiscernibles principle, when in-
terpreted as applying only to purely general, non-
relational properties, can be discussed in connection 
with the numerical identity of coexistent material ob-
jects. But my present concern is not with identity at 
a time, rather it is with identity through or over 
time. As applied to material objects existing at dif-
ferent times the principle, as interpreted above, does 
not give a necessary condition for numerical identity. 
It says only that such objects are identical if they 
have all of their purely general, non-relational 
properties in common. Most material objects, however, 
have different such properties at different times. So 
interpreted, the identity of indiscernibles seems ob-
viously false for most cases of physical object 
identity. 
But the interpretation of the principle now under 
discussion does seem to fit the case of s-t dis-
continuous material objects quite well. For if an ob-
ject x disappears at t, and an object y appears at t 1 0 , 
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it seems reasonable to require that x and y have all 
their purely general, non-relational properties in com-
mon to be numerically identical. If a material object 
retains all its qualitative properties upon reappearing 
this would be one way of justifying an identity claim. 
So it might seem natural to conclude that the identity 
of indiscernibles at least gives us a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the identity of s-t 
discontinuous objects: discontinuous objects are num-
erically idential if the purely general, non-relational 
properties of the object which disappears, at the time 
it ceases to exist, are the same as those of the object 
which appears at a later time. However, it is unreas-
onable to require exact similarity as a necessary con-
dition for identity just for cases of s-t discontinuity 
when we don't make such a requirement for s-t conti-
nuous objects. If I put a piece of blue litmus paper 
in an acid and it changes color, it is still the same 
piece of litmus paper. Generally, when a physical ob-
ject changes or fails to preserve all its properties it 
remains the same object. I see no reason to think that 
s-t discontinuous objects cannot be the same if they do 
not have all the same properties. 
Some interesting arguments have been given that 
purport to show that the foregoing principle cannot be 
a sufficient condition for numerical identity either. 
We can construct examples where we have objects that 
satisfy the conditions the principle lays down and yet 
are not numerically identical. There are at least two 
such examples. First of all, if A disappears at t, and 
at t 5 two or more things or persons which have all of their purely general, non-relational properties in com-
mon with A appear, we must conclude that at least one 
of the later objects is not identical with A. 2 Another 
variation on this type of case is where two or more 
things having all of their purely general, non-
relational properties in common might disappear at t, 
and only one object with these properties subsequently 
reappear. It is concluded that in neither of these 
cases can we accept the commonality of the relevant 
properties as a sufficient condition for identity. 
A reply to the above argument might consist in 
pointing out cases of s-t continuous objects that split 
or unite. A thing existing at t u may suddenly split, like an amoeba, into two exactly similar tilings at t 2. Surely, the reply goes, the original thing is not iden-
tical with either or both of the two similacra. Or two 
objects, say identical twins, may suddently fuse into 
one human body. In both of these cases, the argument 
runs, s-t continuity is preserved and identity is not. 
Since such cases of fission and fusion are possible in 
the same sense of "possible" as s-t discontinuous 
material things are, problems of duplication or fusion 
would present problems for any criterion of identity, 
including s-t continuity and the present version of the 
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identity of indiscernibles. The identity of indiscer-
nibles might still be sufficient for identity in cases 
of s-t discontinuity where there is, in face, a one-one 
relation between things picked out as existing at diff-
erent times, viz., for any object identified at t 0 there will be at most one object that it is to be iden-
tified with later on. 
There are two ways to weaken this reply. The first 
is to question whether s-t continuity is actually pre-
served in cases of fusion or fission. B. A. O. 
Williams has argued that we must apply the criterion of 
s-t continuity if we are to verify the occurrence of 
such union of splitting. But he claims that s-t 
continuity would not be preserved in cases of splitting 
because we have two places occupied by two spatially 
distinct things. 3 However, Williams seems to be using 
the fact that two objects are different by virtue of 
occupying different places, to say they are s-t dis-
continuous with the original. But nonidentity does not 
imply s-t gaps in material things. We have to specify 
the details of fission more carefully in order to 
decide whether s-t continuity is preserved. 
We can imagine a person who instantaneously splits 
into two human bodies or people exactly similar to the 
original body. This is an example of spatial disconti-
nuity, and presumably the original body will not be 
identical with both of the duplicates. It is also 
imaginable for a person to gradually split down the 
middle while both sides begin to take on features of 
the original. This is what happens to the amoeba, and 
s-t continuity is preserved. Similar examples of sud-
den or gradual fusion can be imagined. Since such 
cases could preserves s-t continuity, both the criteria 
of s-t continuity and the present interpretation of the 
identity of indiscernibles and subject to defeat with 
the same counterexamples, so this problem is not pecu-
liar to the identity of indiscernibles used as a 
criterion for the identity of s-t discontinuous things 
or bodies. 
A second way of meeting the objection to the iden-
tity of indiscernibles for cases of s-t discontinuity 
is to question whether identity is clearly ruled out in 
the fission example. If it were the rule, for example, 
that under certain conditions, or at a certain age, a 
body splits into two replicas of the original body, it 
is not certain that it could not be identical with both 
bodies. It would depend on details such as whether the 
appearance of both bodies were the same, the regularity 
of such cases, and the like. But such a view does not 
seem to be out of the question, and it cannot be ruled 
out by appeal to our present concept of physical thing 
identity. 
The strongest reply is that it is actually ir-
relevant to bring up the possibility of duplication or 
fusion in discussing whether this version of the iden-
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tity of indiscernibles (as ranging over purely general, 
non-relational properties) is a criterion for identity. 
This is becasuse we are asking whether identity can be 
preserved in a specifiable imaginable state of affairs, 
and to bring in some other, equally imaginable state of 
affairs, is irrelevant. For we have granted that the 
criterion of exact qualitative similarity will not 
serve as a necessary condition for identity, so to 
bring in cases where it will not apply is not to the 
point. 
The preceding interpretation of the identity of in-
discernibles as ranging over purely general, non-
relational properties limits the cases of identical 
objects with s-t gaps to objects that are qualitatively 
similar in every respect. But this limitation is not 
necessary in order to make up plausible cases of iden-
tical objects with s-t gaps in their history. A causal 
relation or law might serve to correlate s-t discon-
tinuous objects even if exact qualitative similarity, 
or the identity of purely general, non-relation 
properties, is lacking. Suppose that we were able to 
formulate causal laws connecting states of certain 
kinds of things at different stages in the life 
history, and that we know of a certain set of factors 
that are sufficient for an explanation of such changes. 
An example might be aging. Suppose we could predict 
and explain all the changes in the cells and organs of 
a living organism over a two year span, and that we had 
a closed system, i.g. the aging process is not inter-
fered with by external factors we are not taking into 
account. If we were to observe an object or organism 
disappear and an object or organism reappear at the 
same spot two years later, we might be justified in 
identifying them if the object that reappears manifests 
all of the relevant changes such an object would under-
go in the process of aging over the relevant time span. 
Here again the claim is that there are imaginable 
circumstances in which causal relations would be a suf-
ficient condition for identity. But they cannot be 
logically sufficient conditions for identity, since 
they would not hold in all possible worlds. We -can al-
ways describe a possible world where the causal rela-
tion holds and the objects identified at two different 
times are not identical. Thus it is irrelevant to 
point out that such a causal relation could hold be-
tween one object that disappears and two or more ob-
jects that reappear later on, since no claim is made 
that causal relations are logically sufficient for i-
dentity. 
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III 
It seems this discussion forces us to conclude that 
there are imaginable conditions that are sufficient for 
the numerical identity of things and organisms with s-t 
gaps in thier history. It does not follow, however, 
that s-t continuity is, in any sense, a necessary con-
dition for the numerical identity of material things. 
(I am assuming that we want to avoid a skeptical posi-
tion, like Hume's that strictly speaking no two objects 
observed at different times are numerically identical). 
We would be very reluctant to make identity inferences 
in the face of large spatial or temporal gaps for phys-
ical objects. We will not identify an object existing 
today with one that existed 2500 years ago, even if 
there is an exact similarity in appearance. Nor will 
we be willing to identify an object that disappears in 
New York with one that suddenly appears a minute later 
in California, even though they are exactly alike. 
What people would say in such cases is not entirely to 
the point, however. If they did say these objects 
identified at different times were the same object, 
they would not be using our ordinary 'criterion' for 
the identity of physical things. Of course, we can im-
agine circumstances where we might be willing to change 
our criteria. 4 
What lies behind the fact that we consider such 
cases of s-t gaps as a departure from our conceptual 
scheme is the incompatibility of such cases with our 
other beliefs. We have a coherent set of beliefs about 
physical objects that presuppo'ses they have no s-t gaps 
in their routes through the world. A thing reappearing 
at a later time unchanged, or at a distant place almost 
instantaneously, violates our beliefs about the nature 
of bodies and the laws governing their behavior. Thus 
we do not consider such cases to be real possibilities. 
If the world were different, and material objects 
normally had s-t gaps, our criteria for their identity 
would change. But our world is one where physical 
things are s-t continuous existents, and in this sense 
s-t continuity is at least a lawlike, nomologically 
necessary condition, besides being part of what we 
mean, or part of our concept of, the identity of bodies 
through time. 
I spoke of talk about s-t discontinuous bodies as a 
departure from our conceptual scheme. This needs to be 
qualified. It might turn out that the elementary par-
ticles of theoretical physics are best conceived of as 
extentionless, without parts, and as constantly being 
annihilated and recreated. This is not to the point. 
When one speaks of our conceptual scheme he means at 
least that there is a picture of the world that we can 
and do share with each other, a world that is a unitary 
s-t system, with one temporal and three spatial 
dimensions. There is such a framework because the 
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world contains, or is constructed out of, three dimen-
sional material bodies which endure beyond, and be-
tween, our interrupted stretches of observation. Ma-
terial bodies that last through time are fundamental to 
the single unitary s-t framework. There is room in 
such a picture for the s-t discontinuity of isolated 
particular bodies, but only against a background of 
stable, diverse, and s-t continuous bodies. 5 
Otherwise, the conception of a single unitary s-t 
framework which we possess would collapse, or be recon-
structed from moment to moment. 
If we limit ourselves to the ordinary range of 
cases within our actual world, rather than imaginable 
counterexamples or possible worlds, is there any way in 
which s-t discontinuous material objects might be nu-
merically identical? There is one clear way that comes 
from the examples of the starship Enterprise and the 
London Bridge. The crew of the Enterprise supposedly 
travel from one place in space to another by having 
their bodies broken down into atoms, which are then 
beamed through space to the desired spatial location, 
where they are made to reconstitute the bodies being 
transported. London Bridge is moved from London to 
Arizona by physically transporting each of its compo-
nents to Arizona. In these cases, though the objects 
whose identity is in question are not s-t continuous, 
the parts composing those objects are. We have the 
same wholes because we have the same parts, and we have 
the same parts because the parts exhibit s-t continuity 
through the time period in question. The example of 
the disassembled watch is another case in point. When 
the parts of the watch are reassembled we say that it 
is one and the same v/atch. 
The example of the crew of the starship Enterprise 
can be included in the category of science fiction, 
myths, and fables. Fictional cases do not fall within 
the range of actual cases of discontinuity, and they 
make sense partly because we accept whatever the author 
says as true. I think that the reason that we find 
these stories coherent is due mostly to the concept of 
fiction we employ. Anything the author says goes, and 
what is not said, or implied by what he says, has no 
determinate truth-value. Since Shakespeare nowhere 
tells us the weight of Ophelia, the statement that 
Ophelia weighed 110 lbs. has no determinate truth-
value. But comments in the story about her fragility 
and gracefulness do imply that her weight was around 
the figure mentioned, and that 170 lbs. is wrong. 
Similarly, there is no answer to the question of 
whether Aladdin's genie exists during his s-t gaps, or 
to the question of how he does it. To provide further 
explanations or specifications is to add to the story. 
This explains why we do not find accounts of disconti-
nuity of objects in fiction incoherent. There is often 
no answer to the question whether they preserve s-t 
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continuity, and where they don't we write it off as 
fiction. 
The examples of London Bridge and the watch, how-
ever, do seem to justify the conclusion that material 
objects identified as existing at different times need 
not be s-t continuous in order to be numerically iden-
tical within the normal range of cases. Yet s-t 
continuity is involved in these cases, even though it 
is not the s-t continuity of the objects whose identity 
is in question. The view that s-t continuity is a 
necessary condition for the identity of physical ob-
jects is not defeated because it can be revised to in-
clude the continuity of the parts of the bodies. The 
criterion will then be of the form: if a body x is 
numerically identical with body y, then x, or suitable 
components of x, must be s-t continuous with the ex-
istence of y. The qualifier 'suitable components' is 
obvious. If London Bridge were broken down into peb-
bles or rubble, rather than large chunks of stone that 
preserve the original appearance, it could not be reas-
sembled into an exact replica of the original bridge 
that spanned the river Thames. It makes sense to speak 
of transporting London Bridge from London to Arizona 
only if the bridge, when reconstructed, looks the same. 
It is worth pointing out that the above conclusion 
about artifacts is unexciting for the identity of 
things besides physical objects, like organisms, 
because the part-whole distinction is not relevant to 
the identity of a living body or the body of animals. 
Locke argued, and I think correctly, that the identity 
of a living body through time has different criteria 
than the identity of inorganic material bodies. 6 We 
cannot in fact disassemble a living body and reassemble 
the parts again in a way that fails to preserve the s-t 
continuity of the body in question. For the same liv-
ing body must retain a certain organic unity among its 
parts. This is evident in the cases of artificial 
limbs and heart transplants where it takes a great deal 
of time and luck for the human body to adjust to the 
new part. 
Although we cannot deny that the parts of the 
watch, and other disassembled artifacts, preserve s-t 
continuity, there is a serious difficulty in denying 
that the continuity of the thing itself is preserved. 
Our reason for saying this has to be that the thing 
(e.g., watch) no longer exists because its form, shape, 
or function is lost. But we also want to say that 
there are, and can be, cases where a thing undergoes a 
radical change or transformation, and loses its iden-
tity or is replaced by something else, while s-t 
continuity is preserved. This is to say that the 
criterion of s-t continuity, by itself, is not always a 
sufficient condition for identity. However, we cannot 
have it both ways. We cannot use loss of form, shape, 
or function to show that s-t continuity is not a 
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necessary condition for identity and turn around and 
use the same reason to deny that s-t continuity is a 
logically sufficent condition for identity. Otherwise, 
shape, form, and function will be coextensional with s-
t continuity, and the absence of one will be sufficient 
for denying the numerical identity of material objects 
picked out as existing at different times. This will 
contribute nothing towards showing that s-t continuity 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the identity of 
material objects. This is because every case of a loss 
of form, shape, and function will be a case of a s-t 
break, and every s-t gap will be a loss of form, shape, 
and function. One cannot really be used as a coun-
terexample for the other because they will not be 
independent. What I think we want to say is that s-t 
continuity is not logically sufficient for the identity 
of physical objects because there are additional condi-
tions that must be satisfied for identity through time, 
e.g., preservation of the relevant identifying 
properties. 
Part of the difficulty lies in the concept of s-t 
continuity itself. I have suggested that temporal con-
tinuity be defined as there being no point in time at 
which a body does not exist, except for the beginning 
and the end of the life-history of the thing in 
question. An object exhibits spatial continuity if the 
order of places it occupies between any times t 0 and t 4 forms a path through space such that there is no inter-
vening place that the body in question failed to 
occupy. From this definition it is not at all clear 
whether the scattered parts of an object still consti-
tute being that object. For some physical objects, 
such as the geographical aspect of the United States, 
the place it occupies is scattered among intervening 
places. So spatial continuity does not require that 
all of the parts of a object be touching. But just how 
far this can be extended is unclear, e.g., is the solar 
system s-t continuous? It might help if we could 
define s-t continuity without making any reference to 
bodies. The definition proposed above, which involves 
reference to bodies, commits us to some other condition 
or set of conditions, such as function and shape, which 
are essential to the identity of a body, in addition to 
continuity. This close relation between the form, 
shape, or function of a thing and its s-t continuity is 
a backhanded way of stating that s-t continuity has to 
be viewed as criterial evidence for the identity of 
bodies. It is a necessary truth that the presence of 
s-t continuity is (strong) evidence for the identity of 
a material body. 
Suppose we know that there is some pencil identi-
fied at t, and another pencil identified at t s, and we are told that there is an s-t continuous path traced 
between them. To conclude that it is the same pencil 
seems to be mere show. There is no way in which a s-t 
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continuous object can fail to preserve identity unless 
it undergoes a radical change in its function, shape, 
or form. If the pencil were partially burnt and broken 
up into splinters, it or its parts may preserve s-t 
continuity, but what remains may not be the same pencil 
because it no longer can be used to write with, or 
because it is no longer a pencil. There has been a 
Immanuel Kant distinguished between alteration 
(Veränderung) and replacement of exchange (Wechsel). 
Any material body can undergo a change in qualities or 
can be replaced or transformed into a thing of another 
kind or type. In either case there must be something 
which persists amidst the change, and this preserves s-
t continuity. 7 A shirt changes its properties when its 
color is altered from wear, and it can be replaced by a 
dust rag when used for a different purpose. There is a 
change in the kind of thing, but the s-t continuity of 
something remains. 'It' changes form and function. 
Instead of saying 'it', we could say that there is a 
shirt identified at t t that is s-t continuous with a dust rag identified at t s, and these objects are not one and the same thing. 
Consider the case of s-t discontinuity. In order 
to show an object is s-t discontinuous we must use some 
other evidence, or criterion for identity, to say it is 
the same object. It is only after we decide that the 
object is the same as one that is s-t continuous with 
it that we can say that there is a s-t gap in its life 
history. The same cannot be said for the function of 
an artifact. There are many different ways we can 
determine whether a thing has lost its function. We 
can decide to use it for some other purpose, we can 
fail to use it successfully, it can fall unnoticed into 
disuse, and so on. This is a way of pointing out the 
centrality of s-t continuity as a criterion for the 
identity of physical objects. 
The centrality of s-t continuity can be brought out 
further in terms of our knowledge of material thing 
identity. The most fundamental way of knowing that an 
object x is identical with another object y is by an 
uninterrupted stretch of observation of the continuous 
path of x through space and time. In order to know 
that an object has successfully traced a continuous 
path through space and time we must at least be able to 
recognize physical objects as being of a certain kind 
or type. But we cannot tell whether we are seeing an 
object of a certain kind or not unless we are able to 
identify some particular object or other. But contin-
ued observation of a particular object through time as-
sures us of the identity of the object. If one ob-
serves an object for a stretch of time, he will know 
that it is s-t continuous because he knows, on the 
basis of perception and memory, that he has observed 
numerically the same object. 
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Thus one must be capable of knowing that an object 
he has been observing continuously over a stretch of 
time is numerically identical before he can be in a 
position to say it is s-t continuous on the basis of 
his having observed it. Concluding that it was the 
same object, or that it preserved s-t continuity, would 
amount to the same thing. From what is observed one 
can know without inference both (1) that the same ob-
ject was in his visual field during a given time span, 
and (2) the object did not disappear or reappear, or 
change places instantaneously. It is implausible to 
suppose that someone could observe a certain kind of 
object trace a continuous s-t path and conclude from 
this that it is the same thing. Such an identity in-
ference would be a psychological feat, or an unneces-
sary effort of abstraction. One might watch an object 
for a short time, realize it is the same kind of ob-
ject, and conclude that it must be the same object on 
the basis of s-t continuity. But he cannot know that 
he has observed the same kind of object continuously 
unless he can also know it was the same thing. 
The case is different for interrupted observation. 
Jones may conclude that the book on his desk is the 
same book that was there yesterday because he believes 
the door was locked and that no one entered his office 
while he was out. Or someone may tell Jones that they 
saw a book that looked just like the one on his desk 
yesterday. In such circumstances Jones can use his 
belief that the book was not moved or replaced, and was 
there all the time, as a basis for concluding that it 
is the same book. 
Is there any way in which a material thing, or 
suitable parts of it, can fail to preserve s-t con-
tinuity in the ordinary range of cases? Terence 
Penelhum has argued that it is not possible for the 
same thing to cease to exist and, later on, start to 
exist, even though some things may have gaps in their 
life-history, since "this would entail the absurdity 
that a thing can be there throughout to lose its ex-
istence and then regain it." 8 According to Penelhum, 
the concept of some kinds of things require certain 
changes, such as time-gaps during which the parts of 
the object vanish, e.g., a song or a radio serial. A 
parade or group involves certain spatial gaps. But 
Penelhum does not provide any examples of material 
bodies that have spatial or temporal gaps in their life 
histories. His examples are events, processes, or con-
structions out of material bodies. I suspect that this 
is because our concept of a particular material thing 
is that of something which preserves s-t continuity. 
This is why s-t continuity is a criterion for physical 
object identity, and why the two are so closely con-
nected in the ways described in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
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The following examples might serve as counterin-
stances to the general thesis that s-t continuity is a 
nomologically necessary condition for the identity of 
bodies. A slab of ice is melted until a body of water 
is formed, and the water is heated until it evaporates. 
We then reverse the process. The evaporated water 
vapor is condensed until we get the water again, and 
the water is frozen back into a slab of ice. We can 
imagine all of this taking place in an airtight con-
tainer so that the same molecules undergo these trans-
formations. We may be inclined in such a case to say 
that the same chunk of ice forms when the process is 
completed, and if we do say this, we will not be using 
s-t continuity as a criterion for identity. A similar 
example might be constructed for a piece of wood that 
is thrown on a fire. If we reverse the process of com-
bustion in order to get the piece of wood back, there 
will be a s-t gap in its history. It seems clear that 
there is no thing, or suitable parts of a thing, whose 
continuous s-t inclines us to make the identification 
between the two slabs of ice or pieces of wood. 
Are we to admit that the above cases are counterex-
amples to the above general thesis? There seem to be 
two plausible directions one might go in accounting for 
these cases. One might argue that it is only within 
such a closed system, like an airtight container, which 
system itself contains s-t objects on some level, that 
would ever incline us to say the same ice slab is 
reformed. We have the same ice slab only because we 
have the same molecules. If the container were opened 
and the water vapor replaced before the condensation, 
there would be no temptation to say that we had the 
same slab of ice. Another direction we can go to is to 
admit that such cases are counterexamples falling 
within the range of ordinary cases, and that we might 
be willing to say we do have identical bodies in the 
absence of s-t continuity. But it can be pointed out 
that we do not usually think that identity is preserved 
in normal processes of evaporation and condensation 
because they are confined to a closed s-t system, such 
as an airtight container. In the first case we will 
rule out the counterexamples and maintain the thesis 
that the s-t continuity of a thing, or suitable parts 
of a thing, are necessary for identity, but at the 
price of including any parts whatsoever short of anni-
hilation, as suitable. If we take the second direc-
tion, there will be counterexamples to the general the-
sis, but even here the s-t continuity of something will 
be necessary as a background against which the s-t gap 
in the history of a body is made intelligible. I do 
not think it is crucial to decide between these alter-
natives, since the necessity of s-t continuity for the 
reidentification of physical things is brought out suc-
cess fuly regardless of how the issue is to be decided. 
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At the beginning of this section I said that it 
would become apparent that s-t continuity is a 
necessary condition for the identity of material bodies 
identified as existing at different times in the stan-
dard cases, or in typical situations. References to 
the standard cases is meant to exclude fiction and my-
ths, as well as the imaginary counterexamples that 
philosophers dream up, such as the fission example. 
However, in cases like the chunk of ice, not all excep-
tions can be easily ruled out as nonstandard cases, 
since they are in accordance with the regularities we 
believe to be governing the behavior of bodies. But 
such cases seem intelligible only against a background 
of permanent objects. The conclusion one can draw is 
that the concept of a material object and its identity 
and the concept of s-t continuity are not locially 
independent. S-t continuity is a 'criterion* for phys-
ical object identity. In addition, it is incoherent to 
suppose that all material things could be constantly 
changing positions instantaneously or popping in and 
out of one's visual field. In such a world, I think 
that there would be no material things as we know them, 
but only events, processes, and states of affairs. But 
I shall not try to defend this last assertion here. 0 
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